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Stages in Corporate Stability and the Risks 
of Corporate Failure 
FEW would deny that the U.S. economy is today dominated by 
huge corporations. Much recent writing has proposed that these 
corporations form a stable and monopolistic (or oligopolistic) "core" 
around which a more competitive "peripheral" sector exists. Firms 
in the core are said to be "eternal," while firms in the periphery 
demonstrate the mortality and high turnover expected in competi- 
tive industries.1 In another context, Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy 
emphasized the permanence of big corporations when they noted: 
The real capitalist today is not the individual businessman but the corpora- 
tion. .. . The giant corporation of today is an engine for maximizing profits and 
accumulating capital to at least as great an extent as the individual enterprise 
of an earlier period. But it is not merely an enlarged and institutionalized 
version of the personal capitalist. There are major differences between these 
types of business enterprise, and at least two of them are of key importance 
to a general theory of monopoly capitalism: the corporation has a longer time 
horizon than the individual capitalist, and it is a more rational calculator.2 
From an historical perspective, however, it appears to be an open 
question whether big corporations are long-lived or whether they 
tend to be "paper tigers" of glorious but relatively short longevity. 
For example, the most influential study, A. D. H. Kaplan's Big 
Enterprise in a Competitive System, finds that only thirty-one of the 
one hundred largest (by assets) corporations in 1909 would qualify 
for the 1960 "top one hundred" list. Although no absolute criterion 
exists for what would constitute "high" or "low" turnover, Kaplan's 
figures hardly impress one as evidence of a "stable" core. Apparently 
Many of the ideas in this paper were worked out jointly with David Gordon and 
Michael Reich. I would like to thank Jane Baird and Winnie Edwards for their 
research help and an anonymous referee for suggestions. 
1 See, for example, Robert Averitt, The Dual Economy: The Dynamics of American 
Industry Structure (New York: W. W. Norton, 1968); J. K. Galbraith, Economics 
and the Public Purpose (New York: Houghton Miflfin, 1972); James O'Connor, The 
Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York: St. Martin's- Press, 1973); and Richard Edwards, 
David Gordon, and Michael Reich, "Labor Market Segmentation in American 
Capitalism" (mimeo). 
2 Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy, Monopoly Capital (New York: Monthly Review 
Press, 1966), pp. 43, 47. 
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Forbes magazine is correct in asserting that the "corporate minence 
is located on a slippery slope."' 
This article focuses on the issue of corporate stability. I concen- 
trate rather narrowly on the data on turnover and longevity of the 
biggest U.S. corporations in order to show that big business has 
passed through two quite different phases. The initial period of con- 
solidation and transition (roughly 1890 to 1920) was a time of con- 
siderable instability for big corporations. But by the early twenties- 
certainly by 1923-the system had "stabilized," and relatively little 
change has occurred since then. 
SOURCES OF EVIDENCE ON CORPORATE STABILTY 
The conclusion that big corporations lead precarious lives is 
well entrenched in the historical literature. This conclusion exists 
in somewhat surprising contrast to prevailing notions about present 
corporate structure. For example, critics of J. K. Galbraith (or Baran 
and Sweezy or Berle and Means) often argue that big corporations 
are less powerful and more constrained by markets than Galbraith 
asserts, but the critics rarely maintain that the giants are not durable. 
Yet such appears to be the historical consensus. Several studies 
have appeared which attempt to trace the fortunes of big corpora- 
tions since the merger movement at the turn of the century.3 Gen- 
3 One of the earliest works was John Moody's The Truth about the Trusts (New 
York: Moody Publishing Co., 1904); A. A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modem 
Corporation and] Private Property (New York: Macmillan Co., 1932) presented the 
first time series; recent work has been spurred by A. D. H. Kaplan's Big Enterprise 
in a Competitive System (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1954; revised 
edition, 1964) and the annual (since 1956) appearance of the Fortune "500" lists. 
Other studies are Norman Collins and Lee Preston, "The Size Structure of the Largest 
Industrial Firms, 1908-1958," American Economic Review (December 1961); Seymour 
Friedland, "Turnover and Growth of the 50 Largest Industrial Firms, 1906-1950," 
Review of Economics and Statistics (February 1957); Thomas R. Navin, "The 500 
Largest Industrials in 1917," Business History Review (Autumn 1970); "Manage- 
ment," Forbes Magazine (September 15, 1967); David Mermeistein, "Large Indus- 
trial Corporations and Asset Shares," American Economic Review (September 1969); 
and Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., "The Structure of American Industry in the Twentieth 
Century: A Historical Overview," Business History Review, XLIII (Autumn 1969). 
Most authors have not felt compelled to offer a justification for focussing on the 
largest corporations, provoking George Stigler to remark that "the statistical universe 
of the hundred or two hundred largest corporations is inappropriate to studies of 
monopoly and competition. in "The Statistics of Monopoly and Merger," Journal 
of Political Economy (February 1956). Most authors, especially Kaplan, intend 
their studies to be relevant to the monopoly issue on the assumption that high turn- 
over is a sufficient condition for the existence of competition. David Mermelstein, 
among others, has attempted to be more explicit in relating a corporation's overall 
size to its power, which presumably affects its exercise of power in product markets. 
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erally these studies probe the meager historical sources to develop 
lists of the top one hundred (or fifty or five hundred) industrial 
corporations, for a series of benchmark years at roughly decade 
intervals. A. D. H. Kaplan, for example, presented lists of the 
largest (by asset size) one hundred industrial firms for 1909, 1919, 
1929, 1935, 1948, and, in the revised edition, 1960. The data come 
primarily from such reference works as Standard and Poor's and 
Moody's manuals. "Stability" is measured by the number of firms 
that survive from earlier to later lists. 
Kaplan found that of the top one hundred firms in 1909, only 
thirty-one firms remained among the top one hundred in 1960. 
Norman Collins and Lee Preston, after revising Kaplan's lists some- 
what, report thirty-six firms which were in the top one hundred in 
both 1909 and 1958. Seymour Friedland prepared a list very similar 
to Kaplan's but restricted his attention to the top fifty in 1906. He 
found that only eighteen of the original firms survived to the 1950 
list. Similarly, Forbes magazine investigated turnover among the 
top one hundred industrials between 1917 and 1967 and found that 
forty-five on the earlier list survived to the 1967 list. Finally, Thomas 
Navin prepared a list of the top five hundred industrials in 1917. 
According to his list, forty-two of the top one hundred firms (by 
assets) in 1917 continued to be large enough to rank in the top one 
hundred (by sales) on Fortune's 1967 list. Kaplan and Forbes con- 
cluded that turnover was "high," while Collins and Preston and 
Friedland decided that size was indeed related to "stability," al- 
though clearly the evidence used is quite similar. Navin contented 
himself with a careful presentation of the evidence, adding only 
the astute observation that turnover between 1917 and 1967 among 
the largest forty firms seemed substantially less than among the 
remaining four hundred and sixty. 
These studies provide the basis for a consensus on the turnover 
issue. Apparently of the top one hundred firms in the opening decades 
of the century, roughly thirty to forty-five would appear on the 
list fifty years later. Whether or not that figure is large seems to de- 
See "Large Industrial Corporations and Asset Shares: Reply," American Economic 
Review (March 1971). Nevertheless, for studies of concentration per se, industry 
studies would appear to be more appropriate. The focus here is directly on corporate 
power, for which the largest corporations are precisely the correct "statistical universe," 
though of course there is nothing magical about any particular cutoff point (e.g., the 
top 100). 
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pend on one's inclinations, but it does not provide much basis for 
viewing the big corporation as an "eternal ife" institution. 
The issue of corporate power and longevity is not quite so simple, 
however. The work as it now stands can be faulted on several 
counts.4 First, the focus on gross turnover fails to distinguish among 
entrants and exits resulting from mergers, court-ordered dissolu- 
tions, or normalr' growth or decline of companies. For example, if 
two firms on the top one hundred list in 1919 merged to form a new 
company, "turnover" would be increased (two exits, one entrant) 
yet economic power would have become more concentrated. Second, 
artificial distinctions among categories also create "turnover" where 
real industrial power continues: Cities Service Co. (now Citgo), al- 
though a large enterprise before 1954, was classified as a utility; in 
that year it disposed of its remaining domestic utility holdings, thus 
4 All of the studies concerning "Big Business" take the size of the firm's assets as 
the means of determining "bigness." The choice of assets as basis for categorization 
represents an unfortunate but necessary compromise. Whether or not it is theoretically 
the appropriate variable, its measurement is sufficiently difficult to cause unease. The 
assets of a firm pass through a market-and hence are properly valued-only when 
the firm is actually sold. At all other points, the asset values must be estimated. In 
this respect, annual sales (on which the Fortune list is based), number of employees, 
or value added would provide a much more accurate measurement. 
The "errors in variables" problem for assets can be simply illustrated. For ex- 
tractive industries, a considerable part of each firm's assets consist of unmined 
minerals, oil, coal, etc. still in the ground. Not only is it difficult to measure the 
quantity of such stores, the value of those quantities obviously depends on such 
variables as the future costs of extracting them and future product prices. Thus none 
of the consequent estimates can be said to be based at all directly on market values- 
the only "true" test. A different form of the problem emerges most dramatically from 
the steel industry. Early estimates of the assets of U.S. Steel rely on the gross stock 
capitalization at its formation. Yet the merger of Carnegie Steel and several other 
firms to form U.S. Steel resulted in the new firm having stock worth, at face value, 
more than twice the combined assets of the merged companies. Some increase in 
the capitalized value of future earnings could legitimately be expected as a result of 
cost savings, increased monopoly power, and the like, and the larger value was what 
the J. P. Morgan promoters estimated the stock market would bear. The subsequent 
decline of the stock value indicated their mistake, but it does not help the historian 
attempting to calculate asset values. 
It might be argued that the value of the firm can be estimated from the stock 
prices of publicly traded shares, which prices should reflect the present value of the 
discounted stream of expected future net earnings. Even if thishypothesis on stock 
price behavior is accepted, two considerations argue against its appcation: (1) for 
many firms early in the century, the shares were not publicly traded, so this method 
does not provide a general approach; and (2) for many frms whose shares were 
traded, large blocks of stock were held off the market by individual families (e.g., 
the Melons with Gulf stock), upwardly biasing the market price of those shares 
traded. 
These methodological problems are not trivial, but the meagerness of historical 
data sources allows no alternative. Evidence for asset size, though scanty, inaccurate, 
and not always comparable, exists; evidence for other variables does not. 
432 Edwards 
"enabling" it to be classified as an industrial and thereby becoming 
a recent "entrant." Third, an extremely restrictive standard was ap- 
plied to determine when a "new" company had emerged: for ex- 
ample, Kaplan declares that the "Maxwell Motor Co. was the prede- 
cessor of Chrysler Corp.," yet he and others list Maxwell as an exit 
and Chrysler as an entrant.. 
Fourth, there is a basic question as to whether turnover among 
the top one hundred constitutes an adequate measure of "stability." 
As Collins and Preston note, new entrants are -rarely new to the 
economy, and exits, except those by merger or liquidation, rarely 
disappear. Moreover, most of the "action" in turnover is concen- 
trated near the cutoff point: of all two hundred and forty-six en- 
trants and exits between their six benchmark years listed by Collins 
and Preston, one hundred and nine (forty-four percent) were ranked 
eighty-one to one hundred in their last or first year of appearance. 
Fifth, the choice of a base period seems to influence substantially 
the conclusions obtained. Kaplan's data provide an illustration of 
this base-year sensitivity. According to his work, only thirty-one 
firms in the top one hundred in 1909 survive to the 1960 list; sixty- 
nine fail to do so. But of these sixty-nine failures, fully thirty-eight 
(fifty-five percent) had moved off the list by 1919 and never reap- 
peared. If the sixty-nine failures had been spaced evenly over the 
fifty-one-year span, only 13.5 would have been expected to fail by 
1919 versus the thirty-eight that actually failed. Appendix Table I 
indicates that the rate of exits in the period 1909-1919 was never 
less than twice, and usually many times greater than in succeeding 
periods. 
If choice of the base period makes a significant difference, that 
choice should not be made arbitrarily but rather derive from an 
interpretation of American economic development. The authors of 
previous studies place the base before the First World War. Kaplan 
chose 1909; Collins and Preston and others (for example, Mermel- 
stein; Chandler) followed his lead. Friedland chose 1906. Forbes 
chose 1917 because it was the year the magazine was founded. 
Navin accepted 1917, but indicates he would have preferred an 
earlier year. Yet none of these authors provides a plausible historical 
justification for his choice of base year. 
5 Kaplan, Big Enterprise, p. 152-153, notes 13 and 37. On the basis of the "majority 
of assets" rule given below, Dodge is here treated as parent of the modem Chrysler 
Corporation and Maxwell is counted as an "exit;" see Appendix Table V. 
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Finally, focusing on industrials alone underemphasizes the extent 
of the consolidation of power achieved by the early twenties. The 
exclusion of public utilities, railroads, merchandising firms, banks, 
and insurance companies is particularly serious. 
In order to minimize these problems, I adopt the following pro- 
cedures when considering the data. First, I separate the "exits" by 
whether they are due to mergers, liquidations, or simple failures to 
grow. Second, no firm that appears on an earlier list will be excluded 
from a later list because it is "reclassified." Although excluding re- 
classified firms might be appropriate if the category "industrials" 
had a strict and economically meaningful boundary, which it does 
not, it is clearly unjustified in any attempt to understand the con- 
centration of economic power. Third, I consider a newly-named 
company as simply a "successor" and not a new company if the 
assets of the acquired company constitute fifty percent or more of 
the "new" company. Fourth, I look beyond gross turnover; I not 
only consider the strict criterion of whether a firm in an earlier 
year (for example, 1919) has survived to the top one hundred in a 
later year (for example, 1969), but also the more sensible criterion 
of whether it survives as a large and powerful firm-for example, 
whether it has been able to maintain the real value of its assets in 
the later year. I also analyze the category of failures: those firms 
that go bankrupt, enter receivership, or fail to maintain their capital. 
Fifth, rather than casually choose a base, I hypothesize stages which 
justify the treatment of the 1890-1920 period as separate from the 
period which began in the early twenties. Finally, I analyze "indus- 
trials" separately so that my results can be compared directly with 
earlier work, but I also present some evidence for turnover among 
railroad, utility, merchandising, banking, and insurance companies 
as well. 
The issue here resolves itself into two parts. First, was there 
(relatively) great change in the status of big industrial corporations 
between the turn-of-the-century merger movement and the end of 
the war and a constrastingly great (relative) stability between the 
early twenties and the present?8f While there still is no absolute cri- 
6 Since specific points in time are required for the analysis, the earlier period is 
defined as 1903 to 1919, the latter as 1919 to 1969. Operationally I take 1919 as an 
acceptable compromise for the start of the latter period in order that my results can 
be compared directly with earlier work, but some later year, perhaps 1923, would 
be a better cutoff point (see footnote 8). Since these are continuous economic pro- 
cesses, an "exact" cutoff point is not possible nor important. 
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terion for "high" or 'low" stability, the comparison between periods, 
when adjusted to account for the difference between the lengths of 
the periods, provides one yardstick. Second, was the stability 
achieved by the early twenties generalized throughout the economy 
or restricted to a few sectors? 
INSTABILITY ( 1903-1919) vIMsus STABiLITY (1919-1969) 
Data for the earlier period are sketchy and much less accurate 
than for the later period. John Moody, the major source for all these 
studies, did not begin publishing data on industrials until 1900, and 
understandably coverage during the early years was less than com- 
prehensive. Nonetheless, the pattern seems pretty clear. 
Data for the early period derive from several sources.7 First, we 
have the lists prepared by Kaplan and by Collins and Preston for 
1909. Second, for 1903 I have prepared a list (Appendix Table IV) 
of the one hundred largest industrial firms listed in Moody's manual 
for that year. Finally, for the end of the period I use two sets of data. 
For gross turnover, I use the Kaplan and Collins and Preston lists 
for the top one hundred in 1919. For all other analysis, I rely on 
Navin's 1917 data. Although 1919 or 1920 would have been a better 
end-date, the comprehensiveness and accuracy of Navin's list more 
than compensate for the two year lapse. 
For the later period, we have lists provided by Kaplan (1919- 
1960), Collins and Preston (1919-1958), Navin (1917-1967), Forbes 
(1917-1967), and a comprehensive list (1919-1969) I have compiled 
from all these sources, cross-checked with the Moody manuals and 
other sources. 
I consider successively three comparisons of the two periods. First, 
I look at gross turnover-simply the movement of firms in an earlier 
(1903, for example) list of the top one hundred industrials out of 
a later list (for example, out of the 1919 list). Interestingly, com- 
parison of this crude measure for the pre- and post-1919 periods 
fairly accurately indicates the differences between the two periods 
although it overstates turnover in both. Second, I consider a different 
7 These are not, strictly spealdng, entirely independent sources. All begin with 
the Moody's manuals. However, each supplements this basic source with investigation 
of company records and reports, correspondence with surviving firms, corporate 
histories, and similar materiaL. Moreover, each uses a slightly different definition for 
what constitutes "industrial" firms. Finally, treatment of assets and estimates differ 
somewhat. 
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and "weaker" criterion of turnover: I first take the assets of the 
smallest firm (that is, that listed one hundred) in an earlier list; I 
then inflate this figure by the ratio of prices in the end and base 
periods, so that the new figure represents the constant-dollar analog 
for the asset cutoff of the base period. Firms are listed as "survivors" 
if during the period they maintained assets equal or greater in 
constant-dollars than the smallest firm in the base year. Firms that 
were acquired, were dissolved, or failed to maintain their assets 
are listed as exits. Third, I consider the types of exits from the "weak' 
criterion list and the relative success of the survivors. 
Gross turnover is given in Table 1. As indicated in column (4), the 
TABLE 1 
CROSS TURNOVERS-TOP 100 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Rate of Exits 
Per 100 Firms 
Survivors Exits Other Per Year 
1903-1919 
(Edwards) 45 55 0 3.4a 
1909-1919 
(Kaplan) 61 39 0 3.9a 
1909-1919 
(Collins & Preston) 61 39 0 3.9a 
1917-1967 
(Navin) 47 54 0 L.10 
1917-1967 
(Forbes) 47 51 2b 1.Oc 
1919-1960 
(Kaplan) 53 45 2b 1.1e 
1919-1958 
(Collins & Preston) 52 45 3b 1.20 
1919-1969 
(Edwards) 51 59 0 1.0C 
a These figures can be corrected for the Standard Oil and American Tobacco disso- 
lutions, which created 10 new entrants to the top 100 list by 1919, by defining 
"survivors" as being in the top 110 according to Navin's 1917 list; no change occurs 
in the Edwards list and only two more firms survive in each of Kaplan's and Collins 
and Preston's lists. 
b Excluded as inappropriate: Great Northern Iron Ore Properties (excluded from 
Forbes, Kaplan, and Collins and Preston lists) was in fact simply a trust to collect 
royalties from iron ore lands owned by the James Hill family; Mexican Petroleum 
(excluded from Forbes list) was owned by Pan-American Petroleum, which also 
appears on list; Magnolia Petroleum (excluded from Kaplan and Collins and Preston 
lists) controlled by Standard Oil of N.Y., which acquired Magnolia starting in 1918 
(see N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1918, p. 15, and Nov. 10, 1925, p. 33). American Express 
(excluded from Collins and Preston list) was and is primary a financial corporation. 
0 Adjusted for base different from top 100 firms (i.e., Navin base 101; Forbes 98; 
Kaplan 98; Collins and Preston 97; Edwards 110). 
Source: See text and footnote 3. 
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TABiE 2 
"WEAK" TURNOVER-TOP 100a 
Excluded Due Rate of Failure 
to Reclassifi- Per 100 Top 
Survivors Failures cation, etc. Firms Per Year 
1903-1917 
(Edwards)c 66 34 0 2.4 
1909-1917 
(Kaplan)d 65 35 0 4.4 
1909-1917 
(Collins & Preston)d 65 35 0 4.4 
1917-1967 
(Navin)e 69 32 0 0.6b 
1917-1967 
(Forbes)f 67 31 2 0.6b 
1919-1960 
(Kaplan)g 73 25 2 0.6b 
1919-1958 
(Collins & Preston)h 72 25 3 0.6b 
1919-1969 
(Edwards)' 70 40 0 0.7b 
a All prices used in calculations given in Appendix Table VI. 
b Adjusted for base different from top 100 firms (i.e., Navin base 101; Forbes 98; 
Kaplan 98; Collins and Preston 97; Edwards 110). 
c Smallest firm 1903 had assets of $15 million; price change = +97%; firms are 
survivors if 1917 assets exceed $29.6 million. 
d Smallest firm 1909 according to both Kaplan and Collins and Preston had assets 
of $25 million; price change +74%; firms are survivors if 1917 assets exceed $43.5 
million. 
e Smallest firm in 1917 according to Navin had assets of $50.0 million; price 
change = +65%; firms are survivors if 1967 assets exceed $82.5 million. 
f Smallest firm in 1917 according to Forbes had assets of $54 million; price 
change = +65%; firms are survivors if 1967 assets exceed $87.1 million. 
g Smallest firm in 1919 according to Kaplan had assets of $54 million; price 
change = +33%; firms are survivors if 1960 assets exceed $71.8 million. 
h Smallest firm in 1919 according to Collins and Preston had assets of $60.5 million; 
price change = +33%; firms are survivors if 1958 assets exceed $79.9 million. 
I Smallest firm in 1919 according to Edwards had assets of $50.0 million; price 
change = +49%; firm is survivor if 1969 assets exceed $89.5 million. 
Source: See text and footnote 3. 
rate of exits per year is more than three times greater in the pre-1919 
period than it is in the post-1919 period. Moreover, as note (a) indi- 
cates, these results do not reflect "spurious" turnover due to the 1911 
Standard Oil and American Tobacco dissolutions. 
Table 2 gives the number of survivors and failures on the "weak" 
turnover criterion. Firms listed as "failures" necessarily disappeared 
or suffered a decline in the real value of their assets; some listed as 
"survivors" also suffered a decline, but not sufficient to move them 
entirely out of the group. The rate of failures per one hundred firms 
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per year is again at the least three times as great (2.4/0.7) in the 
pre-1917 as post-1919 period. 
Table 3 gives the distribution of the failures listed in Table 2. As 
shown in column (6), in the pre-1917 period few exits were caused 
by firms disappearing through mergers (nine to twenty percent), 
whereas in the post-1917 period most (sixty-four to seventy-eight 
percent) were due to this cause. Mergers may reflect either a firm's 
weakness (and hence susceptibility to takeover) or strength (attrac- 
tiveness of its earnings to the acquiring firm) or simply consolida- 
tion (for example, merger of three or more firms where no firm pro- 
vided at least half of the assets of the consolidated company). Thus 
the category of "mergers" represents exits of both strong and weak 
companies, and little can be concluded about whether they are 
"successful" or "unsuccessful" companies. 
On the other hand, exits caused by "failure to grow" and 'liqui- 
dation" are unambiguous failures. As the last two columns show, 
firms failed far more frequently in the pre-1917 than in the post-1919 
period-by at the least a factor of 8 (1.93/0.23). 
Thus we can conclude, I believe, that the period from the 1898- 
1902 merger movement through the First World War was a period of 
relatively great instability compared to the post-war period. More- 
over, the magnitudes themselves are important. In the earlier period, 
on the average two to four firms every year dropped below the 
minimum (constant dollar) assets of the smallest firm in the top one 
hundred in the base year. In the later period, it took approximately 
five years for one firm to drop out of the group. 
Table 4 gives the number of firms listed in 1903 and in 1919 which 
continued until 1917 or 1969 as independent firms. Even for those 
that remained independent throughout each (or both) of the periods, 
the 1903-1917 span was a time of considerable risk for big corpora- 
tions-column (7) indicates that sixty-eight percent of the survivors 
suffered a decline in their real assets between 1903 and 1917, 
whereas only three percent of the survivors did so between 1919 
and 1969. Moreover, this does not appear to be simply a price 
phenomenon: seventeen firms between 1903 and 1917 suffered de- 
clining asset values measured in current dollars, versus only one in 
the later period. 
Finally, we can use Navin's list for another type of stability test. 
The top one hundred (or so) corporations in 1917 constituted true 
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industrial "giants." They were generally integrated firms which had 
significant national market power, they had extensive political influ- 
ence, and they obtained access to outside capital through the major 
capital markets. On the other hand, the bottom one hundred or 
two hundred firms in Navin's list of five hundred can only be seen 
as medium-sized firms; they were largely local or regional firms, 
their market power was usually minimal, their stocks were not 
widely traded, and their political power was minimal except through 
groups like employer's associations or the National Association of 
Manufacturers. As a consequence, their fates were also quite dis- 
similar: while ninety-five of the top one hundred firms escaped 
liquidation, only seventy-four of the firms listed four hundred and 
one to five hundred (one hundred and sixty of those listed three 
hundred and one to five hundred) escaped liquidation. The differ- 
ences are significant (chi-square test) at the .001 levels. The big 
firms survive; medium-sized (and presumably small) firms face 
relatively high odds of failure.8 
ANTI-TRUST ACTIVITY 
In addition to the instability during the 1903-1919 period reflected 
in the turnover data, the anti-trust activities of the Federal govern- 
ment created great uncertainty.9 The first big case was the Northern 
Securities case, decided in 1904, which dissolved J. P. Morgan's 
railroad consolidation. In the following ten or so years, major anti- 
trust suits were filed against Standard Oil, American Tobacco, Inter- 
national Harvester, U.S. Steel, Armour, Swift, American Sugar Re- 
fining-all among the top ten industrial corporations in 1909-as 
well as Aluminum Co. of America, General Electric, Corn Products 
Refining, duPont, and many other big firms. Standard Oil and 
American Tobacco were dissolved into thirty-four and sixteen parts, 
respectively. International Harvester, Corn Products, and duPont 
were forced to sell portions of their operations. Armour, Swift, and 
8 The choice of 1919 rather than, say, 1923 as the starting point of the later 
period may result in a- conservative bias to the evidence for dierences in stability 
between the two periods: 7 of the 40 "failures" listed in the bottom row of Table 2 
had already occurred by 1923 (see Appendix Table V); the rate of "failure" during 
these four years (1.75 failures per 100 top firms per year) is very close to halfway 
between the failure rates for the two periods on either side. This and, as an anony- 
mous referee has suggested, other evidence (e.g., consolidation in the auto and steel 
industries) make 1922 or 1923 a more plausible cutoff date. 
9 For a discussion of early anti-trust suits, see Eliot Jones, The Trust Problem in 
the United States (New York: Macmillan, 1921). 
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the other big packing companies were forced to give up a mutually 
owned processing firm which had served as the agency for industry. 
wide collusion. 
This unprecedented-and unrepeated-intervention by Federal 
agencies contributed to the uncertainty which surrounded the birth 
of big corporations. For example, U.S. Steel, when incorporated, 
controlled sixty-five percent of the steel market. For a time, it ap- 
peared that the government would define "unreasonable" restraint 
of trade as a situation which existed when, along with a number 
of other conditions, it could be shown that one firm controlled more 
than fifty percent of the market. U.S. Steel apparently decided to 
forego further consolidation, indeed even allow some erosion of its 
position, in order to escape anti-trust action.10 Big corporations did 
not find comfortable a situation in which the Anti-Trust Division 
could attack seven of the largest ten companies and actually force 
dismemberment of two. 
COMPENSIVENESS OF TOH POST-WORLD WAR I CONSOLIDATION 
Turning now to the character of the capitalist consolidation 
achieved by the early 1920's, I attempt to demonstrate two asser- 
tions. First, I argue that the consolidation was achieved across most 
of the industrial categories. Firms which would continue to domi- 
nate those industries had emerged in industries processing or manu- 
facturing food, tobacco, lumber and paper products, chemicals, 
petroleum, rubber, metals of all sorts, farm and construction ma- 
chinery, electrical machinery, communications equipment, motor 
vehicles, and photographic equipment. With few exceptions-new 
industries like airplanes and computers and a few old ones like fur- 
niture, textiles, and drugs-the industrial structure which continues 
at present was set by 1920. 
Second, I attempt to show that the consolidation extended far 
beyond the usual category of "industrials' and in fact included 
transportation, utilities, insurance, banking, and to a lesser extent, 
merchandising. Firms in these areas that had achieved dominance by 
1920-again with a few exceptions-continue to dominate today. 
Appendix Table II gives the distribution of those sixty-three firms 
10 Ida Tarbell, The Life of Elbert H. Gary (New York: Appleton, 1926), pp. 
257-258. Although the strategy proved to be in vain as far as avoiding prosecution, 
since U.S. Steel was prosecuted anyway, the company later obtained a favorable 
judgment. 
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which survive to 1969 from the 1919 list, by industry category, along 
with their 1969 sales and 1969 rank in that industry. The data on in- 
dustry and firm sales for 1919 do not exist, so no comparison be- 
tween the beginning and end of the period is possible. The indus- 
tries are divided by two- and three-digit SIC (Standard Industrial 
Classification) categories. Those categories in which no 1919 firms 
survive to 1969 have been grouped. Since the categories vary con- 
siderably in total sales (for example, some three-digit industries have 
more sales than some two-digit ones), the economic importance of 
each category differs but can be interpreted from the total industry 
figures for "value of shipments." 
What is important in the table is the broad range of industries 
represented by 1919 firms. Although the biggest concentration oc- 
curs, as expected, in heavy industry (steel, non-ferrous metals, metal 
fabrication, petroleum, communication equipment, autos, chemi- 
cals, electrical and other industrial machinery, and farm and con- 
struction machinery), the post-war consolidation also included a 
series of lighter, consumer-oriented industries-meat packing, sugar, 
tobacco, and lumber and paper."1 
Appendix Table III shows some of the consolidation which oc- 
curred in economic activities other than manufacturing and mining. 
Leaders which had emerged by 1919 continued in 1969 to dominate 
these other areas. The thirty-six telephone, gas, and electric com- 
panies listed as 'large" in 1919 include eight of the top ten utility 
companies in 1969, as well as Cities Service Co., which, although 
now classified as an industrial, has sufficient assets to rank in the 
top ten.12 Of the top fifteen life insurance companies in 1917, 
fourteen continue among the top fifteen half a century later. The 
eight merchandising firms with 1919 assets greater than $20 million 
include six of the largest ten merchandising firms by assets in 1969. 
Nine of the largest fifteen banks in 1922 continued among the top 
fifteen in 1967; five of the remaining six were acquired by banks now 
among the top fifteen. The list could go on, but what is important is 
the extent to which the industrial structure established by the end 
of the First World War has continued to the present. 
The evidence reviewed above indicates that corporate capitalists 
11 These results thus broadly conform to those given by Alfred Chandler In The 
Structure of American Industry." 
12 These data do not show the several large utility consolidations which were created 
in the 1920's nor the dissolutions under the Public Utility Holding Company of 1935. 
The persistence of the original companies Is hence all the more remarkable. 
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had achieved a quite widespread and enduring consolidation of 
their positions by 1919. The industrial system which emerged out 
of this consolidation has been termed "monopoly capitalism"-a 
system in which the industrial center of the economy is dominated 
by large, oligopolistic, "eternal-life" corporations.13 The industrial 
structure might therefore be said to have passed through an earlier, 
unstable period and moved into the stable monopoly capitalist 
phase. For the remaining corporations, as the data reviewed above 
reveal, the risks of doing business in a 'competitive" economy were 
considerably reduced. It was on the foundation of this stable indus- 
trial structure that the latest phase, that of multinationalism, de- 
veloped and is still unfolding. 
RICHARD C. EDWARDS, University of Massachusetts, Amherst 
18 For a more complete discussion of monopoly capitalism see the sources cited 
in footnotes 1 and 2 above. 
AipPiNx TABrz I 
FOR 100 LARGEST FIRMS IN 1909 THAT DID NOT APPEAR ON 
1958 OR 1960 TOP 100 LISTS 
EXPECTED AND ACTUAL EXITS 
(corrected for length of period) 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
1909-1919 1919-1929 1929-1935 1935-1948 1948-1960 
Kaplan's Data 
(1) Actual Number 38 14 3 5 9 
(2) Expected Number 13.5a 7.6b 4.5b 9.8b 9.1b 
(3) Ratio of (1) to (2) 2.8 1.8 0.7 0.5 1.0 
(4) Ratio of Actual Exits In 
(a) to (b) ... (e), 
corrected for length of 
period - 2.7 7.6 9.8 5.1 
Coins' and Preston's Data 
(5) Actual Number 35 16 3 7 3 
(6) Expected Number 13.1c 7.4d 4.5d 9.7d 7.4d 
(7) Ratio of (5) to (6) 2.7 2.2 0.7 0.7 0.4 
(8) Ratio of Actual Exits In 
(a) to (b) . . . (e), 
corrected for length of 
period - 2.2 7.0 6.5 11.7 
a Calculated on assumption that all (69) exits in period 1909-1960 were evenly 
distributed over 51-year period. Rows may not add due to rounding. 
b Calculated on assumption that all (31) exits In period 191910 were evenly 
distributed over 41-year period. 
c Calculated on assumption that all (64) exits in period 1909-1958 were evenly 
distributed over 49-year period. 
dCalculated on assumption that all (29) exits in period 1919-1958 were evenly 
distributed over 39-year period. 
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APPENDIX TABL II 
DISTRIBUTION OF LARGEST FIRMS IN 1919 (EDWARDS LIST) WHICH 
SURVIVE AS INDEPENDENTS IN 1969, BY INDUSTRY, 
WITH 1969 COMPANY SALES AND INDUSTRY VALUE OF SHIPMENTS 
(Millions of dollars)a 
SIC 201 (meat) 24,878 SIC 281, 282, 286, 287, and 289 
1. Swift 3,108 (all other chemicals) 34,315 
2. Armour 2,152 1. duPont 3,655 
9. Cudahy 353 2. Union Carbide 2,933 
SIC 202 (dairy products) 13,445 7.W.Allie Chemia 1,316 
2. Borden 1,740 7 Aliied C al 1,316 
SIC 203(caned and reserved SIC 29(petroleum) 24,411 SI fo3cands and70 1. Standard Oil (N.J.) 17,538 
7. Libby, McNeill and Libby 346 2. Mobil Oil 5,682 
SIC 204(grain mill products) 10,390 4. Gulf Oil 4,953 
2. Corn Products Refining 1,218 5. Standard Oil (Calif.) 3,825 
(CPC Interational) 6. Standard Oil (hid.) 3,469 
SIC 205(bakery products) 7,04X 8. Atlantic Richfield 2,691 
2. National Biscuit 726 11. Union Oil (Calif.) 1,660 14. Getty Oil 1,140 SIC 206(sugar) 2,469 18. Ohio Oil (Marathon) 924 
2 Great Western Sugar 2649 SIC 30(rubber) 15,728 
8. Cuban Amer. Sugar 1. Goodyear 3,215 
(CuNo. Amer.) Suor91 2. Firestone 2,279 (No. Am.) 3.US9ube1Uioyl ,5 
SIC 208(beverages) 11,090 4. B.F. FGoodrich 1,229 
4. National Distillers and 
Chemical 700 SIC 31 (leather) 5,561 
SIC 207(confectionary) and none 
209(misc. foods) 13,507 SIC 32(stone, clay, glass) 17,075 
none none 
SIC 21 (tobacco) 5,151 SIC 331 (basic steel) and 
1. R. J. Reynolds 1,575 332(iron and steel 
2. American Tobacco 1,361 foundries) 26,345 
4. Ligget and Myers 489 1. U.S. Steel 4,754 
SIC 22(textiles) 23,112 2. Bethlehem Steel 2,928 
none 4. Republic Steel 1,500 
SIC 23(apparel) 24,250 6. Inland Steel 1,216 
none 7. Jones and Laughlin 1,062 
SIC 24(lumber) and 8. Lykes Youngstown 928 
26(paper and pulp) 38,083 10. Wheeling Steel 506 
1. International Paper 1,777 SIC 333, 334, 335, 336, and 
4. Weyerhauser 1,239 339(all other basic metal 
SIC 25(fumniture) 9,251 work) 23,786 
none 1. Aluminum Corp. of Amer. 1,545 
SIC 27(printing and 2. Anaconda 1,411 
publishing) 25,068 3. Kennecott 1,050 
none 6. National Lead 930 
SIC 283(drugs) 6,228 7. American Smelting & 771 
none [8] Internatl. Nickel of Canada 684 
SIC 284(soaps and toilet 8. Phelps Dodge 672 
articles) 7,620 23. U.S. Smelting, Mining 
1. Procter and Gamble 2,708 & Refining 175 
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APPENDIX TABLz II (Continued) 
SIC 34(fabricated metals) 39,574 SIC 364, 369(allotherelec. 
2. American Can 1,724 mach.) 15,735 
6. Crane Co. 551 none 
SIC 352(farm machinery) and SIC 371(motor vehicles) 51,522 
353(construction mach.) 13,400 1. General Motors 24,295 
1. International Harvester 2,653 2. Ford 14,756 
3. Deere and Co. 1,043 3. Dodge (Chrysler) 7,052 
4. Allis Chalers 805 SIC 374(railroad equipment) 2,260 
SIC 355(special industrial machinery, 1. Pullman 739 
except metal-working) 5,790 2. American Car and Foundry 
1. United Shoe Machinery (ACF Ind.) 270 
(USM) 356 SIC 372, 373, 375, 376, 379 
SIC 351, 354, 357, 358, 359 (other transportation 
(all other machinery, except equip.) 28,670 
elect. mach.) 28,950 none 
none SIC 386(photographic 
SIC 361, 362(electrical indus- equipment) 4,317 
trial mach.) 1. Eastman Kodak 2,747 
and 369(misc. elect. SIC 381, 382, 383, 384, 385 
mach.) 13,001 (other instruments) 6,383 
1. General Electric 8,448 none 
2. Westinghouse 3,509 2. Westinghouse , 9 SIC 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, SIC 363 (household appliances) 6,161 and 399( misc. mfg.) 9,665 1. Singer Mfg. Co. 1,902 New Jersey Zinc (Gulf & 
SIC 365, 366(communications Western) 1,564 
equip.) 17,638 United Fruit (United Brands) 1,371 
1. Western Electric 4,883 Crucible Steel (Colt kid.) 729 
a The total sales for all companies in an industry may exceed the industry's total 
"value of shipments" since company sales figures include foreign sales and sales in 
other industries. 
Sources: Industry "value of shipments" taken from U.S. Bureau of the Census, An- 
nual Survey of Manufactures, 1969, General Statistics for Industry Groups 
and Industries, M69(AS)-1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1971), Table 1; sales for individual companies taken from Fortune 
magazine, "The 500 Largest Industrial Corrations" (May 1970), and 
Moody's Industrial Manual, 1971 (New York: Mood/s Investor Service, 
1971); rank within industry calculated from News Front magazine, "The 
1000 Leading U.S. Manufactures" (Midsummer 1970). 
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APPNDix TABLE IV 
LARGE INDUSTRIALS IN 1903 
FIRMS WITH 1903 ASSETS EXCEEDING $15 MILLION 
1903 1917 
Assets Assets 1917 Date and Nature 
(Milions (Millions Name if of End as 
Name of $) of $) Different Independent 
U.S. Steel 1,547 2,450 
Consolidated Tobacco 187 164 Amer. Tobacco (1911 divided Into 
16 cos.) 
Intl. Mercantile Marine 170 204 
Amalgamated Copper 155 226 Anaconda 
U.S. Leather 141 145 Central Leather 
American Sugar Ref. 126 137 
Intl. Harvester 120 265 
Amer. Smelt & Ref. 100 222 
Consolidated Lake Lake Superior 
Superior 98 49 Corp. 
Standd Oil 98 574 (1911 divided Into 
34 cos.) 
Distillers Securities 90 56 
American Can 81 133 
Corn Products Ref. 80 112 
Pullman 74 143 
U.S. Shipbuilding 73 382 Bethlehem Steel 
American Woolen 69 123 
National Biscuit 61 74 
Amer. Car & Foundry 60 127 
Pittsburgh Coal 60 113 
U.S. Realty Construction 60 32 U.S. Realty & Im- 
provement 
U.S. Rubber 59 258 
International Paper 59 78 
Republic Iron & Steel 56 122 
Crucible Steel 55 90 
Virginia-Carolina Chem. 53 94 
Amer. Locomotive 50 84 
United Copper 50 - 1913 liquidated 
Swift 50 306 
Lackawanna Steel 50 117 
Cambria Steel 45 - 1916 acq. by Mid- 
vale Steey 
American Writing Paper 42 41 
General Electric 42 232 
Monongahela River Coal 40 1914 acq. by Pitts- 
burgh Coal 
Intl. Salt 38 12 
Pressed Steel Car 37 45 
American Bicycle 37 - 1915 bankrupt 
American Ice 36 35 
Amer. Agric. Chemical 35 83 
Pennsylvania Steel 34 - 1916 acq. by 
Bethlehem 
Lehigh Coal & Navigation 34 81 
International Nicker 34 63 
448 Edwards 
ApprNDix TABLE IV (Continued) 
1903 1917 
Assets Assets 1917 Date and Nature 
(Milions (Miions NaneIf of Endas 
Name of $) Of $) Different Independent 
American Linseed 34 39 
American Malting 33 18 
American Cotton Oil 33 42 
American Hide & Leather 33 44 
Lehigh & Wilkes-Barre 
Coal 33 40 
Intl. Steam Pump 33 1915 liquidated 
Marsden 32 4 Amer. Milling 
Amer. Steel Foundries 32 39 
United Box Board & Paper 31 1912 receiver/ 
liquidated 
Tenn. Coal & Iron 31 - 1907 acq. by U.S. 
Steel 
Colorado Fuel & Iron 30 95 
Singer Mfg. 30 193 
Jones & Laughlin Steel 30 160 
National Lead 30 59 
Coper Range 
Consolidated 29 8 
New York Dock 28 33 
Houston Oil 28 34 
Union Bag and Paper 27 19 
Rubber Goods Mfg. 27 - 1917 acq. by U.S. 
Rubber 
Railway Steel Spring 27 43 
Chicago Junction RR and 
Union Stockyards 27 31 
U.S. Cotton Duck 26 - 1913 acq. by Intl. 
Cotton Mills 
U.S. Coast Iron Pipe 25 31 
Bordens CondensedMilk 25 48 
Natl. Enameling & 
Stamping 24 39 
Standard Rope & Twine 23 1906 liquidated 
Homestake Mining 22 29 
Westinghouse Electric 21 165 
United Shoe Machinery 21 74 
Amer. Shipbuilding 20 34 
Associated Oil 20 81 
Royal Baking Powder 20 30 
Pacific Mill & S.S. 20 10 
NatI. Sugar Refining 20 13 
Allis-Chalmers 20 59 
Eastman Kodak 20 64 
Amer. Beet Sugar 19 31 
Intl. Silver 19 18 
Electric Vehicle 18 - 1912 liquidated 
Sloss-Sheffield Steel 18 28 
American Thread 18 30 
Union Typewriter 18 32 Remington Type- 
writer 
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AppzNDix TABiL IV (Continued) 
1903 1917 
Assets Assets 1917 Date and Nature 
(Millionw (Mions, Name If of End as 
Name of $) of $) Different Independent 
Fairmont Coal 18 - 1912 acq. by Con- 
solidation Coal 
American Express 18 59 
Central Foundry 18 11 
Virginia Iron, Coal, 
& Coke 17 16 
Standard Milling 17 29 
Consol. Ry. Lighting and 
RefrigCral 17 1909 liquidated 
General Chemical 17 57 Allied ical 
Dye 
Pacific Coast Co. 17 24 
Brooklyn Ferry of N.Y. 17 1908 liquidated 
Kirby Lumber 16 17 
United Fruit 16 110 
Electric Storage Battery 16 25 
Armour 16 314 
New England Cotton Yarn 16 8 
Newport News ShipbuiId- 
ing and Drydock 15 31 
Paac Packing & Navig. 15 1904 liquidated 
Diamond Match 15 22 
Source: See text. 
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APPENmx TABSz V 
LARGE COMPANIES IN 1919 
1919 1969 
Assets Assets Name in Date and Nature 
(Millions (Milllons 1969 if of End as 
Name of $) of $) Different Independent 
(a) Industrials-Firns with 1919 Assets in Excess of $50 Million 
U.S. Steel 2,366 6,560 
Standard Oil (N.J.) 853 17,537 
Armour 491 607 
Swift 490 744 
General Motors 447 14,820 
Bethlehem Steel 347 3,224 
Ford 333 9,199 
U.S. Rubber 305 1,258 Uniroyal 
Socony Mobil 300 7,163 Mobil Oil 
Midvale Steel & 1923 acq. by 
Ordinance 200 - Bethlehem 
General Electric 277 6,007 
Intl. Mercantile Marine 269 1968 acq. by 
Walter Kidde 
International Harvester 267 2,026 
Anaconda 237 1,763 
Sinclair Oil 232 - 1968 acq. by At- 
lantic-Richfield 
Texas Oil 224 9,281 Texaco 
Amer. Smelting & Ref. 215 824 
duPont 214 3,453 
Amer. Tobacco 206 1,508 Amer. Brands 
Union Carbide 200 3,355 
Phelps Dodge 186 811 
G.F. Goodrich 176 1,256 
Standard Oil (Calif.) 174 6,146 
Jones & Laughlin 169 1,223 
Pullman 169 461 
Pittsburgh Consolidation 1966 acq. by Con- 
Coal 161 tinental Oil 
Westinghouse Electric 160' 2,478 
Standard Oil (Ind.) 155 5,151 
Weyerhauser Timber 153 1,646 
Lig ett *&Myers 151 545 
Chl e Copper 149 - 1923 acq. by 
Anaconda 
United Fruit 148 479 United Brands 
American Sugar 147 304 
Central Leather 147 1953 liquidated 
Gulf Oil 143 8,104 
Singer 140 1,439 
Amer. Car & Foundry 139 420 A.C.F. Industries 
Corn Products 138 931 C.P.C. Interna- 
tional 
Kennecott Copper 136 1,652 
American Can 135 1,372 
Consolidation Coal 135 1945 acq. by Pitts- 
burgh Coal 
Aluminum Co. of 
America 133 2,429 
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ApEmNDzx TABLz V (Continued) 
1919 1969 
Assets Assets Name in Date and Nature 
(MiUions (MiUions 1969 if of End as 
Name of $) of P) Different Independent 
American Woolen 133 - 1955 acq. by 
Textron 
Ohio Cities Service 1965 acq. by 
(Pure) 132 -Union Oi 
Prairie Oil & Gas 130 - 1932 acq. by Sin- 
clair 
Crucible Steel 127 588 Colt Industries 
Wilson 127 1967 acq. by Ling- 
Temco-Vought 
Republic Steel 126 1,782 
Virginia-Carolina 1962 acq. by Mobil 
Chemical 121 - Oil 
Willys-Overland 113 - 1953 acq. by 
Kaiser 
Wheeling Steel 113 617 
Goodyear Tire 113 2,763 
Amer. Agric. Chem. 111 - 1963 acq. by Con- 
tinental Oil 
Cuba Cane Sugar 110 1958 liquidated 
Youngstown Sheet and 
Tube 109 1,402 Lykes-Youngstown 
Western Electric 108 3,172 
Morris 103 - 1923 acq. by 
Armour 
R. . Reynolds 103 1,693 
Philadelphia, &Reading 100 - 1968 acq. by 
Northwest 
Calumet and Hecla 100 - 1968 acq. by Uni- 
veral Oil 
Atlantic Gulf and West 
Indies S.S.L. 99 - 1953 liquidated 
W. R. Grace 97 1,541 
Lackawana Steel 95 - 1923 acq. by 
Bethlehem 
Atlantic Refining 95 4,235 Atlantic-Richfield 
Proctor and Gamble 94 1,692 
Amer. Locomotive 93 1964 liquidated 
Cudahy Packing 92 72 
Steel & Tube 92 - 1923 acq. by 
Youngstown 
S. & T 
Union Oil of Calif. 90 2,476 
Eastman Kodak 89 2,830 
P. Lorillard 88 - 1968 acq. by 
Loews 
Pan-American Pet. 88 - 1929 acq. by St. 
Oil (Ind. ) 
Studebaker 88 - 1967 acq. by Wor- 
thington 
National Lead 88 695 
International Paper 86 1,887 
Lehigh Coal & Nav. 85 - 1965 liquidated 
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APPENDIX TABLE V (Continued) 
1919 1969 
Assets Assets Name in Date and Nature 
(Millions (Mllions 1969 if of End as 
Name Of $) Of $) Different Independent 
Deere 84 1,405 
Colorado Fuel & Iron 83 - 1969 acq. by Crane 
Ohio Oil 82 1,300 
U.S. Smelt, Min. & Ref. 80 254 
Vacuum Oil 80 1931 acq. by 
Mobil OH 
Utah Copper 79 1923 acq. by Ken- 
necott 
United Shoe Machinery 79 USM Co. 
National Biscuit 78 474 
Baldwin Locomotive 76 1965 acq. by 
Armour 
New Jersey Zinc 75 2,172 Gulf & Western 
Firestone Tire 74 2,019 
Midwest Refining 73 - 1923 acq. by St. 
Oil (Ind.) 
Associated Oil 69 1,859 Getty Oil 
Libby, McNeill, & Libby 68 263 
Prairie Pipe Line 67 - 1932 acq. by Sin- 
clair 
Maxwell Motor 67 1927 acq. by 
Dodge 
Crane 66 577 
International Nickela 65 1,477 
Packard Motor 63 - 1954 acq. by 
Studebaker 
American Cotton Oil 63 - 1925 reorganized/ 
liquidated 
Greene ananea Copper 61 1929 acq. by 
Anaconda 
Allis-Chalmers 61 702 
Borden 61 1,069 
Pierce Oil 60 1939 liquidated 
Tidewater Oil 60 - 1926 acq. b Asso- 
ciated Oil 
Cuban Amer. Sugar 60 39 North Amer. Sugar 
Inland Steel 59 1,326 
United Verde Extension 
Mining 57 - 1937 liquidated 
Distillers Securities 55 889 Nat'l Distillers & 
Chem. 
Great Western Sugar 54 222 Great Western 
United 
Allied Chemical & Dye 54 1,524 
United Verde Copper 50 - 1934 acq. by 
Phelps Dodge 
Weirton Steel 50 1,454 Nat'l Steel 
Dodge Brothers 50 4,668 Chrysler 
(b) Railroads-Firms with 1919 Assets in Excess of $300 Million 
Pennsylvania 1,500 6,851 Penn-Central 
New York Central 1,243 1968 acq. by Penn- 
sylvania RR 
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APPzNx TABLz V (Continued) 
1919 1969 
Assets Assets Name in Date and Nature 
(Mliions (Mlions 1969 if of End as 
Name of $) Of $) Different Independent 
Union Pacific 1,000 2,322 
Atchison, Topeka and 
Santa Fe 930 2,193 Santa Fe Industries 
Baltimore and Ohio 890 - 1968 acq. by 
Chesapeake & 
Ohio 
Northern Pacific 770 2,876 Bungton- 
Northern 
Great Northern 757 1968 acq. by 
Northern Pacific 
Chicago, Milwaukee, St. 
Paul & Pacific 732 705 
Chicago, Burlington, 1969 acq. by 
& Quincy 620 - Northern Pacific 
Erie 589 1968 acq. by Nor- 
folk & Westen 
Southern 569 1,511 
Chicago and North- 
western 534 984 
N.Y., New Haven, and 
Hartford 523 1961 bankrupt 
Illinois Central 482 914 
Missouri Pacific 433 1,390 
Chicago, Rock Island, 
and Pacific 430 460 
Chesapeake & Ohio 397 2,672 
Southern Pacific 386 2,979 
Louisville & Nashville 380 1,292 Seaboard Coast 
Lines 
Norfolk & Western 360 2,633 
St. Louis-San Fran. 358 471 
Reading 322 340 
(c) Merchandising Firm-Finn with 1919 Assets in Excess of $20 Milion 
Sears, Roebuck 155 7,079 
F. W. Woolworth 94 1,301 
Montgomery Ward 71 2,779 Marcor 
May Dept. Store 45 883 
Great Atlantic & 
Pacific Tea 38 911 
Cimbel 25 448 
Jewel Companies 21 406 
S. S. Kresge 21 798 
(d) Life Insurance-Firms with 1917 Assets in Excess of $50 Milionb 
New York Life 935 1,169 
Metropolitan of N.Y. 704 23,512 Metropolitan Life 
Mut; of N.Y. 634 3,318 
Equitable of N.Y. 577 12,576 Equitable Life 
Assurance 
Prudential 475 23,595 
Northwestern Mut. 394 5,229 
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AppDzDx TABiz V (Continued) 
1919 1969 
Assets Assets Name in Date and Nature 
(Millions (Millions 1969 if of End as 
Name Of $) of $) Different Independent 
Mutual Benefit (N.J.) 219 2,257 
Penn Mutual 183 2,203 
John Hancock 156 8,380 
Aetna Life 141 7,330 
Travelers 129 5,460 
Union Central of Ohio 121 881 
Mass. Mutual 101 3,436 
New England Mutual 85 2,981 New England Life 
Connecticut Mutual 80 2,250 
National Life of Vt. 69 1,247 
Guardian Life 55 781 
State Mutual of Mass. 55 1,087 
(e) Banks-Firms with 1922 Deposits in Excess of $200 Millione 
National City Bank, N.Y. 757 12,940 First National 
City, N.Y. 
Guaranty Trust Co., N.Y. 492 6,445 Morgan Guaranty 
Trust, N.Y. 
Chase National Bank, Chase Manhattan, 
N.Y. 466 13,751 N.Y. 
National Bank of 1929 acq. by Mor- 
Commerce, N.Y. 427 - gan Guarantee 
Trust 
Continental and Commer- Continental Illinois 
cial Bank, Chicago 380 4,823 National Bank 
and Trust, 
First National Bank, N.Y. 325 - g 1955 acq. by First 
National City, 
Bankers Trust, N.Y. 312 5,094 N.Y. 
Equitable Trust, N.Y. 271 1930 acq. byChase 
Manhattan 
Irving National Bank, Irving Trust 
N.Y. 263 3,219 
Mechanics and Metals 1926 acq. by Chase 
Nat'l Bank, N.Y. 252 Manhattan 
Bank of Manhattan, N.Y. 240 - 1955acq. byChase 
Manhattan 
Central Union Trust, Manufacturers 
N.Y. 239 6,787 Hanover Trust, 
N.Y. 
First National Bank, 
Chicago 232 4,389 
Bank of Italy, Bank of America, 
San Francisco 230 16,417 San Francisco 
Union Trust Co., liquidated 1938 
Cleveland 224 
Corn Exchange Bank, 1955 acq. by 
N.Y. 214 - Chemical Bank, 
N.Y. 
(f) Utilities Except Urban Transit-Firms with 1919 Assets in Excess of $50 Million 
American Tel. & Tel. 1,530 43,903 
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1919 1969 
Assets Assets Name in Date and Nature 
(MiUions (Milions 1969 if of End as 
Name of $) Of $) Different Independent 
Cities Service Co. 532 2,066 
North American Co. 361 1,279 Union Electric 
Western Union 230 829 
Consolidated Gas of N.Y. 176 4,069 Consolidated 
Edison of N.Y. 
Pacific Gas & Electric 173 4,030 
New York Edison 153 - 1936 acq. by Con- 
solidated Edison 
of N.Y. 
Comonwealth Edison 130 2,948 
Public Service Corp. 
of N.J. 127 2,349 
Peoples Gas, Light, & People's Gas of 
Coke 112 1,252 Chicago 
United Gas Improvement 105 185 UGI Corp. 
Southern California 
Edison 101 3,003 
Montana Power Co. 99 297 
Puget Sound Power & 
Light 90 405 
Spring Valley Water 80 - 1930 purchased by 
San Francisco 
New Orleans Railroad 1924 acq. by Elec- 
& Light 76 - tic Power & 
Light 
Detroit Edison 75 1,663 
Columbia Gas & Electric 74 1,894 Columbia Gas 
System 
Portland Railway, Light, Portland Electric 
and Power 72 395 
Utah Securities 69 - 1925 acq. by 
Electric Power 
& Light 
Consolidated Gas, Electric Baltimore Gas & 
Light, and Power of Electric 
BSltore 66 949 
Public Service of 1939 acq. by Com- 
Northern Illinois 64 - monwealtEdi- 
son 
Chicago Utilities Co. 63 - 1924 liquidated 
Edison of Boston 63 652 Boston Edison 
Mass. Gas Co. 62 370 Eastern Gas & Fuel 
Niagara Falls Power 61 - 1950 acq. by Ni- 
agara ohawk 
Comonwealth Power, Rail- 1929 acq. by Coi- 
way, and Light 59 - monwealth & 
Southern Corp. 
Western Power Corp. 57 - 1925 acq. by 
Northern Amer- 
ican Co. 
Ohio Fuel Supply 56 1927 acq. by Co- 
lumbia Gas and 
Electric 
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APPENDIX TABLE V (Continued) 
1919 1969 
Assets Assets Name in Date and Nature 
(Millions (Millions 1969 if of End as 
Name of $) of $) Different Independent 
Brooklyn Union Gas 56 332 
American Water Works 55 1,091 Allegheny Power original company 
659 American Water divided by court 
Works order 
United Light & Railway 54 1950 dissolved by 
court order 
Georgia Railroad and The Southern 
Power 53 2,738 Company 
Virginia Railroad and Virginia Electric 
Power 53 1,531 and Power 
Consumers Power 52 1,811 
American Light & American Natural 
Traction 51 1,557 Gas 
Brooklyn Edison 50 1928 acq. by Con- 
solidated Edison 
Mississippi River Power 50 1925 acq. by 
North American 
Co. 
(g) Urban Transit Companies-Firms with Assets in Excess of $50 Million 
Brooklyn Rapid Transit 223 1944 dissolved 
Hudson and Manhattan Hudson Rapid 
RR 128 53 Tubes 
Interborough Consolidated 
Corporation 126 1923 liquidated 
Philadelphia Rapid 
Transit 123 1968 liquidated 
Chicago Railway 
Company 114 1946 bankrupt 
United Railway and 
Electric (Baltimore) 92 1935 liquidated 
Third Avenue Railway 79 1962 acq. by New 
York 
Boston Elevated 76 1947 acq. by 
Boston 
N.Y. Consolidated 1942 acq. by New 
Railroad 65 York 
United Railway Invest- 
ment Co. 65 1926 dissolved 
Detroit United Railway 64 1928 liquidated 
New York State Railway 62 1967 liquidated 
Twin City Rapid Transit 58 24 MEI Corp. 
Chicago City Railway 55 1946 bankrupt 
Chicago Elevated Railroad 51 1946 bankrupt 
a International Nickel, incorporated in New Jersey, was the parent of International 
Nickel of Canada, Ltd., until 1928. 
b Period covered is 1917 to 1967. 
c Figures given are for deposits, not total assets; period covered is 1922 to 1967. 
Source: See text. 
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APPENDIX TABLE VI 
PRICES USED IN PRICE CORRECTIONS OF ASSET BASES: 
"WHOLESALE PRICES, ALL COMMODITIES" 
Early Period 
1900 56.1 
1903 59.6 
1909 67.6 BASE: 1926 = 100 
1917 117.5 
1947 152.1 
Later Period 
1917 60.6 
1919 71.4 
1958 9449 BASE: 1967 = 100 
1967 100.0 
1969 106.5 
Sources: Early: Historical Statistics of the U.S., Table E13-24, p. 116. Later: Statis- 
tical Abstract of the United States, 1972, U.S. Department of Commerce 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1973), Table No. 559, p. 342. 
The prices for 1917 and 1919 were spliced onto this series using data listed 
in previous source. 
